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Abstract
Is there a sense in which we can be said to empathize with a philosophical posi-
tion and, if so, what does empathy consist of here? Drawing on themes in the 
work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, I sketch an account of the relationship between 
philosophical language and philosophical thought, according to which the task of 
understanding, evaluating, and building upon an explicit philosophical position can 
involve engaging with the experiential world of its author. If accepted, this account 
has broader implications for how we conceive of both empathy and philosophical 
thought.
Keywords Empathy · Indeterminacy · Language · Merleau-ponty · Possibility · 
Thought
1 Introduction
In this paper, I will sketch an account of what I call “philosophical empathy.” One 
might take that term to concern any of the following: (a) empathizing with someone 
who happens to be a philosopher; (b) empathizing with that person as a philosopher, 
by attending specifically to her philosophical concerns; (c) empathizing in a phil-
osophical way, by integrating philosophical knowledge and skill into an empathic 
process; (d) empathizing with a philosophical position. Achievement (a) is of little 
interest: if we can empathize with people in general, then we can empathize with 
people who happen to be philosophers. While (b) and (c) may well identify real and 
interesting phenomena, both require further clarification. However, it is tempting to 
dismiss (d) out of hand: there is no such thing as empathy with a philosophical posi-
tion. Given that (d) might seem counter-intuitive, it is also of considerable interest if 
it does turn out to be a genuine phenomenon. In what follows, I will restrict my use 
of the term “philosophical empathy” to “empathy with a philosophical position” and 
will advance a conception of philosophical thought that accommodates this.
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Why might philosophical empathy strike one as implausible? Suppose a position 
attributed to a specific philosopher is taken to consist in a series of interrelated prop-
ositions and arguments that can be evaluated by someone with appropriate knowl-
edge and training, without any consideration of its author’s psychology. Granted, we 
might seek to explain its origins or discredit it through psychological speculation, 
but we are not required to do so and, as good philosophers, we should refrain from 
ad hominem arguments. Philosophers have proposed various competing accounts 
of empathy and it is often hard to distinguish substantive disagreements from ter-
minological disputes. Nevertheless, they at least share the assumption that empathy 
involves somehow engaging with the experiences of another individual. So, regard-
less of which account of empathy we endorse (or accounts, if we want to be plural-
ists), it seems that philosophical empathy is ruled out. The task of understanding 
another philosopher’s experience is distinct from that of understanding and evaluat-
ing her explicit position.
In response, one could point out that we don’t merely comprehend static philo-
sophical positions. Philosophical understanding also involves appreciating patterns 
of philosophical thinking. And this, one might argue, involves “cognitive empathy.”1 
However, empathy concerns experience, and it might be objected that there is no 
characteristic phenomenology associated with propositional thought or its compre-
hension. So, what is further needed is the acknowledgement that thinking about p 
or believing that p does have a phenomenology, distinct from that of non-cognitive 
sensory experiences.2 It could then be maintained that empathizing with a philo-
sophical position involves empathizing with the associated thought processes. But 
this still does not add up to (d). In coming to appreciate a philosophical position, I 
might well think through it and have a cognitive experience of the relevant proposi-
tions, but it remains my experience. When I further seek to understand the thoughts 
of another philosopher, I don’t just engage in philosophical thinking myself in order 
to comprehend and evaluate her position; I perform an additional, separate act of 
cognitive empathy. What we have, if anything, is some combination of (b) and (c), 
rather than (d).
In what follows, I will draw on the writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in order 
to piece together an alternative approach, one that collapses the distinctions between 
(b), (c), and (d). I will focus on a strand of thought that runs through Phenomenol-
ogy of Perception and various later works, including several of the essays collected 
in Signs and Sense and Non-Sense, as well as the incomplete manuscript The Prose 
of the World (set aside by Merleau-Ponty in 1952). Merleau-Ponty’s thinking shifts 
in various ways over the course of these years. However, the themes I will empha-
size appear consistently and together amount to a cohesive position. Although I will 
not offer a thorough defence of that position, I will at least suggest that it is coherent, 
1 The term “cognitive empathy” has been employed by several recent authors. For instance, Spaulding 
(2017, p.13) defines it as “the capacity to understand another person’s state of mind from her perspec-
tive.”
2 See Bayne and Montague (2011) for a good overview of the current “cognitive phenomenology” 
debate.
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phenomenologically plausible, and worthy of further investigation.3 If broadly right, 
it has wider-ranging implications for how we conceive of empathy, nudging us away 
from the currently orthodox view that empathizing with another person is most 
centrally a matter of using one’s own mind to “simulate” her experiences. It also 
amounts to a conception of what it is to think philosophically, use philosophical lan-
guage, and understand philosophical positions.
2  Understanding philosophers
Across several works, Merleau-Ponty sketches a view of philosophical understand-
ing that includes what I call “philosophical empathy.” In this section, I will outline 
what I take that view to involve. Then, in the remainder of the discussion, I will 
relate it to differing conceptions of empathy. What I have in mind comes across most 
clearly and explicitly when Merleau-Ponty reflects on his relationship to Husserl. 
However, it is also a more general theme in his work. According to Merleau-Ponty, 
the tasks of understanding, criticizing, and further developing a philosophical posi-
tion do not consist simply in grasping the meaning of what is written or said and 
then agreeing or disagreeing with it. His alternative is comprised of three interre-
lated claims, concerning (1) philosophical “style”; (2) idiosyncratic uses of written 
and spoken language, and (3) what Husserl calls the “horizonal” structure of experi-
ence. These claims are inextricable. While (1) and (2) may at first appear obscure 
and hard to pin down, they are illuminated by the inclusion of (3).
Starting with (1), Merleau-Ponty suggests that there is more to appreciating a 
philosophical position than comprehending the propositions that together com-
prise it. A philosophy also has a holistic style, a distinctive feel or atmosphere. This 
is something we may encounter before we have quite understood what is being 
claimed. A more specific, determinate apprehension of the philosopher’s thought 
then takes shape. Finding one’s way around a philosophical text is thus akin to 
immersing oneself in and exploring an unfamiliar place, which has an initial, incho-
ate feel to it. As Merleau-Ponty writes in Phenomenology of Perception:
And just as, when in a foreign country, I begin to understand the sense of 
words by their place in a context of action and by participating in everyday 
life, so too a philosophical text that remains poorly understood nevertheless 
reveals to me at least a certain “style”–whether Spinozistic, critical, or phe-
nomenological–which is the first sketch of its sense.4
The nature of this elusive style and how a philosopher’s position emerges out 
of it are inseparable from (2), idiosyncratic use of language. It is not enough to 
3 I do not want to suggest that the position outlined is to be found only in Merleau-Ponty. I am sure that 
aspects of it, or something much like it, can be drawn from other philosophers as well. I discuss Merleau-
Ponty’s writings in order to illustrate a way of thinking about philosophical thought and empathy, rather 
than taking him to be its sole advocate.
4 Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012, p. 184).
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understand the words in a generic way; one must also understand how that particular 
philosopher uses them. As with style, this involves coming to appreciate something 
holistic. It is not simply that a given philosopher uses specific terms in idiosyncratic 
ways; her uses hang together as a singular pattern or Gestalt and cannot be grasped 
independently of their interrelations. We begin by attributing established, generic 
meanings but gradually come to appreciate the subtle, distinctive, and interlocking 
ways in which words are employed, as the philosopher’s distinctive style is progres-
sively resolved.5
Both (1) and (2) can be made clearer by appealing to (3). Central to Merleau-
Ponty’s relationship to Husserl is a shared emphasis on how experience incorpo-
rates a sense of the possible and, with it, degrees of openness and indeterminacy. 
Consider Husserl’s use of the term “horizon” to refer to structured systems of pos-
sibilities that are ubiquitous in human experience.6 When I look at a given entity, my 
sense of what it is and my sense that it is both depend on an experience of possibili-
ties involving that entity. Husserl emphasizes interrelated sensorimotor possibilities, 
such as that of touching an entity that is seen, turning it around to view a hidden 
side, smelling it, and so forth. These experiences have an “if, then” structure. If I or 
someone else were to do something, or if something were to happen, then x would 
be revealed to perception, where the content of x (what is experienced as possible) 
is variably determinate: in turning around a cup, one might anticipate seeing a spe-
cific colour or just some colour or other. But no perceptual experience involves a 
fully determinate grasp of every potential perception involving a given entity; there 
is always some degree of openness and indeterminacy.
Horizons do not adhere to individual entities in isolation from a wider environ-
ment; experience as a whole has a cohesive horizonal structure. This structure is 
bound up with our bodily phenomenology. For the most part, experienced possibili-
ties consist in the anticipation of what will happen when we act upon the perceived 
environment. Hence, they are inextricable from a sense of our bodily capacities and 
dispositions. Felt bodily dispositions to engage in perceptual activities are, at the 
same time, salient possibilities that we experience as residing in perceived entities.7
Merleau-Ponty indicates that what applies to sensory perception of our surround-
ings applies equally to the perception of spoken and written language. Words, sen-
tences, and relations between them are not uttered and written in isolation from our 
wider engagement with a world of possibilities but entwined with our practice. Like 
perceived objects, they have what Husserl calls a “horizonal” structure. For the most 
part, the horizon of a familiar entity such as a drinking glass is shaped by habitual 
activities involving that entity and/or entities of its type. Consequently, the possi-
bilities experienced as adhering to it are fixed and unwavering. Likewise, the pos-
sibilities that attach to utterances (which point both to other utterances and to non-
linguistic aspects of practice) are fixed largely by convention–by shared habit and 
consensus. Nevertheless, when speaking and writing, our words sometimes deviate 
7 Ratcliffe (2015, Ch. 2).
5 e.g. Merleau-Ponty (1964c, p. 91).
6 e.g. Husserl (1952/1989).
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from these conventions and point to novel arrangements. A familiar entity taken out 
of context or an unfamiliar entity placed in a familiar context can be encountered in 
terms of possibilities that differ from the norm, in ways that are often experienced as 
disruptive. Likewise, a work of art can combine habitual meanings with something 
incongruous, shaking up and–in so doing–making explicit practical meanings that 
are more usually taken for granted. In a similar way, a philosopher’s distinctive style 
can be construed as a cohesive horizonal structure that is to some degree idiosyn-
cratic, deviating from established arrangements of possibilities while evoking new 
ones.8
Merleau-Ponty states explicitly that we encounter linguistic possibilities in a way 
that resembles practically engaged perceptual experience. Skilful, perceptual activ-
ity involves coming to adopt an optimal orientation relative to an object of percep-
tion, through which possibilities are resolved and integrated so as to reveal it as 
what it is. Similarly, we strive to relate to a philosophical text in a way that provides 
optimal resolution, where its possibilities coalesce into a distinctive, unambiguous 
arrangement:
Even though only Abschattungen of the signification are given thematically, 
the fact is that once a certain point in discourse has been passed the Abschat-
tungen, caught up in the movement of discourse outside of which they are 
nothing, suddenly contract into a single signification. And then we feel that 
something has been said–just as we perceive a thing once a minimum of sen-
sory messages has been exceeded.9
This is not to be construed in terms of rendering something fully determinate. 
Even when language is resolved in this way, a philosophical position, whether spo-
ken or written, continues to point beyond itself. In the same way that perceived 
objects are “inexhaustible, never entirely given,” “what is expressed is never com-
pletely expressed.”10 In comprehending it, we do not simply glue together the fixed, 
exhaustive meanings attaching to however many words and sentences. We continue 
8 There is more to be said about what, exactly, these possibilities adhere to and how they should be inte-
grated into a broader account of linguistic meaning. They do not depend on some quality of perceived 
speech, as they are also integral to our experiences of written texts. Hearing and reading a word are 
analogous to encountering the same entity through sight and touch. As Edie (1976, p. 88) observes, quot-
ing from Phenomenology of Perception, “words carry, beneath their conceptual meanings and forms, an 
‘immanent’ ‘existential meaning’, which is not merely rendered by them but which ‘inhabits them’.” This 
is what I have suggested we think of in terms of a horizonal structure attaching to perceptual experiences 
of written and spoken words. There is also a great deal more to say about the kinds of possibilities that 
are integral to our experiences of written and spoken language (what it is that we experience as possible) 
and how these possibilities relate to, influence, and are influenced by our wider experience of the world.
9 Merleau-Ponty (1964a, p. 91). The term “maximum grip” is often used to refer to Merleau-Ponty’s 
conception of how we pre-reflectively position ourselves to achieve an optimal vantage point for per-
ceiving something (Merleau-Ponty 1945/2012, Part Two, Ch. 3). We could similarly speak of “linguistic 
maximum grip,” a dynamic, progressive way of orienting ourselves towards another person’s language, 
such that we are better placed to resolve its holistic, idiosyncratic possibilities.
10 Merleau-Ponty (1973, p. 37).
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to engage with possibilities that are to some degree indeterminate, even after the 
position has coalesced out of an initially nebulous style.
The incompleteness is not exclusively epistemic; a philosophy does not remain 
indeterminate only because one does not know someone else’s thoughts in their 
entirety. As with perceptual experience, there are degrees of indeterminacy in the 
first-person case too. Although we have some sense of where our thoughts are tak-
ing us, their destination often remains hazy; we only recognize where exactly we 
were heading when we have arrived there. And completion is not solely a first-per-
son matter; it is not restricted to the progression of one’s own thought. When con-
templating the work of another philosopher, we may similarly actualize possibilities 
inherent in it, sometimes in ways that the author did not foresee or even could not 
have foreseen. This is how Merleau-Ponty construes his debt to Husserl:
At the end of Husserl’s life there is an unthought-of element in his works 
which is wholly his and yet opens out on something else. To think is not to 
possess the objects of thought; it is to use them to mark out a realm to think 
about which we therefore are not yet thinking about.11
Merleau-Ponty proceeds to “evoke this unthought-of element in Husserl’s 
thought,” to actualize possibilities that are there, inherent in Husserl’s thinking 
although not explicitly recognized by Husserl.12 To inhabit a system of philosophi-
cal possibilities in this way is not to duplicate them, but to embark on paths towards 
which they point. As Merleau-Ponty acknowledges, our ability to do so is con-
strained by circumstances, including the nature and extent of our relationship to the 
thinker in question. We invariably encounter a philosophy from a partial perspective, 
one of many potential vantage points.
To appreciate how this adds up to a kind of empathy, another aspect of Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy needs to be introduced. When we write and speak, in philosophi-
cal contexts and more widely, a clear line cannot be drawn between language and 
thought; the two are inextricable.13 The relationship between them is much like that 
between an emotion and its expression. In both cases, one does not arise first, in 
its entirety, and only then cause the other—at least not always. There is a tendency 
within an emotional feeling towards its expression. Furthermore, the expression can 
be partly constitutive of the emotion–it completes it rather than follows it. Expres-
sive completion can render an emotional experience more determinate, even making 
it the kind of experience it is.14 Sometimes, it is only by expressing my anger that I 
come to realize it is anger that I feel, that I am angry with you, that I am angry about 
what you did. Similarly, a thought is not an inner entity that is fully formed and only 
11 Merleau-Ponty (1964a, p. 160).
12 Merleau-Ponty (1964a, p. 160).
13 Merleau-Ponty 1945/2012, Part One, VI).
14 See Colombetti (2009) for an interesting discussion of ways in which the “expression” of an emotion 
and, more specifically, its linguistic expression, can be partly constitutive of that emotion. See also Rat-
cliffe (2017, Ch. 4) for discussion of how linguistic expression can render emotional experiences more 
determinate.
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afterwards converted into language. Prior to its expression, it is not something that 
can be introspected and pinned down precisely:
Thought is nothing “inner,” nor does it exist outside the world and outside of 
words. What tricks us here, what makes us believe in a thought that could exist 
for itself prior to expression, are the already constituted and already expressed 
thoughts that we can silently recall to ourselves and by which we give our-
selves the illusion of an inner life. But in fact, this supposed silence is buzzing 
with words–this inner life is an inner language.15
A philosopher’s thinking is not wholly hidden inside a head from which words 
emanate. Where it might seem so, this is attributable to the activity of inner speech. 
Like speaking and writing, inner speech is partly constitutive of thinking, contribut-
ing to the generation and actualization of possibilities. However, spoken and written 
language are not always preceded by fully formed inner speech. Hence, by engaging 
with the distinctive horizonal structure of a person’s words, we may also encounter 
something of her thinking, including how it points to certain possibilities in a cohe-
sive, non-accidental, but not fully explicit way. We do not “get inside someone’s 
head,” coming to experience her possibilities in much the same way she currently 
does or once did. Rather, our own distinctive perspective is retained throughout–we 
follow paths that she would not have followed and actualize possibilities that her 
thought pointed to but of which she was not yet explicitly aware. We don’t discover 
a static, fully determinate inner life but a direction that is neither straightforwardly 
present nor absent.
Now, even if some of this is accepted, it is not plausible as a phenomenological 
account of what one experiences when wading through the latest articles in a profes-
sional journal that one feels obliged to consult. However, we can appeal here to a 
contrast drawn by Merleau-Ponty between original or authentic and institutionalized 
language. He suggests that much of what we say and write is dictated largely by con-
vention, running along familiar paths laid out by habitual, shared norms. Our words 
are imbued only with the usual, generic possibilities:
We live in a world where speech is already instituted. We possess in ourselves 
already formed significations for all these banal words [paroles]. They only 
give rise in us to second-order thoughts, which are in turn translated into 
other words that require no genuine effort of expression from us, and that will 
demand no effort of comprehension from our listeners.16
This is to be contrasted with a speech that evokes new possibilities, enabling one 
to say and think what could not be said or thought before. In Phenomenology of Per-
ception, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between “languages” (langages) and “speech” 
(parole). While language is fixed by layers of “sedimented” habit, speech brings 
words together in ways that generate new possibilities for experience and thought.17 
15 Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012, pp. 188–9).
16 Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012, p. 189).
17 Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012, p. 202).
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In later works, he develops this distinction in new ways by drawing heavily on his 
interpretation of Saussure.18
Returning again to the structural parallels between language and perception, it 
might appear to naïve reflection that perceptual experience simply reveals the ingre-
dients of a stable, fully determinate world. But this involves failing to acknowledge 
how seemingly straightforward perceptual achievements are indebted to a history of 
habitual activities and associated patterns of expectation. In short, the achievement 
of having an experiential world at all, a pre-reflective backdrop to perception, action, 
and thought, is overlooked. In the same way, Merleau-Ponty suggests that “the clar-
ity of language is in fact established against an obscure background.”19 Linguistic 
meanings might seem stable, determinate, fully shared, and unproblematic, but only 
because we fail to recognize the prior phenomenological accomplishment of having 
a world within which conventional language is embedded and follows established 
trails. However, there is also authentic language, which reveals new possibilities, 
harbouring the potential to expose the ordinarily taken-for-granted world as a con-
tingent accomplishment. A “sedimented” language is thus contrasted with the poten-
tial to generate novel meanings and thoughts:
One can have no idea of the power of language until one has taken stock of 
that working or constitutive language which emerges when the constituted lan-
guage, suddenly off centre and out of equilibrium, reorganizes itself to teach 
the reader – and even the author – what he never knew how to think or say.20
It would be wrong to construe this as a simple contrast between good and bad lan-
guage, even if we limit ourselves to the practice of philosophy. Sedimented language 
is integral to having a world and is therefore required in order to think and speak at 
all. Authentic speech involves a disturbance of that world and could not arise with-
out there being something to disturb. Merleau-Ponty’s conception of how we under-
stand another philosopher is inextricable from his conception of what philosophy 
(and, more specifically, phenomenology) is. It is concerned with acknowledging and 
articulating a world more usually presupposed, a world that hides behind the obvi-
ous: “Philosophy is not a particular body of knowledge; it is the vigilance which 
does not let us forget the source of all knowledge.”21 Philosophy involves gaining 
some insight into what is more usually overlooked, and disturbances of the possi-
ble are integral to that process. Thus, what we have is a conception of philosophi-
cal inquiry that encompasses language, thought, and our wider relationship with the 
18 e.g. Merleau-Ponty (1973, Ch. 2). For a good discussion of of how Merleau-Ponty interprets and 
draws upon Saussure, see Andén (2018). For a wider-ranging discussion of Merleau-Ponty on language, 
see Edie (1976).
19 Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012, p. 194).
20 Merleau-Ponty (1973, p. 14).
21 Merleau-Ponty (1964a, p. 110).
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world.22 It is something that Merleau-Ponty both describes and, at the same time, 
enacts through his own distinctive style.
I will now suggest that, if something like this is admitted as part of the philosoph-
ical enterprise, then engaging adequately with a philosophical position (one that is 
original in a certain kind of way) requires empathy. Without it, we might still be able 
to describe, discuss, and criticize another philosopher’s work, but we would miss 
something important–an idiosyncratic system of indeterminate possibilities. There 
are also implications here for our understanding of what empathy is and what it is 
not.
3  Empathy?
According to some philosophers in the phenomenological tradition, includ-
ing Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein, empathy (Einfühlung) is a quasi-perceptual 
achievement, which comprises our most basic sense of others as subjects of experi-
ence and also provides more specific insights into what they are experiencing.23 We 
do not have to experience someone’s words in order to recognize that person as a 
subject of experience. Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty’s conception of our engagement 
with written and spoken language can be integrated into a broader conception of 
empathy as somehow perceptual or perception-like. The point to emphasize is that 
expressions are not secondary to but integral to emotions and thoughts. For Mer-
leau-Ponty, experiencing someone’s expression of emotion or thought is analogous 
to having a perspective upon a perceived object, which points to possibilities for 
further experiences involving that object and therefore includes a much richer (but 
still incomplete) grasp of it. Similarly, the thought or feeling is not hidden behind 
the perceived expression or gesture but inseparable from the possibilities with which 
it is imbued.
In this manner, authentic speech (including writing) is inseparable from thought. 
As Merleau-Ponty writes, “reading projects us beyond our own thoughts toward the 
other person’s intention and meaning, just as perception takes us to things them-
selves across a perspective of which we become aware only after the event.”24 Per-
ception of experience in expression and our engagement with language thus have a 
23 see, e.g., Zahavi (2001, 2010, 2014).
24 Merleau-Ponty (1973, 14).
22 Heidegger, in his 1929–30 lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, draws a com-
plementary distinction between genuine philosophizing and practices of proposition-hurling that remain 
embedded in conventional language: “a dialogue that is a philosophizing is rarely or never at all attained 
among those who busy themselves with philosophy, yet do not philosophize. So long as this elementary 
readiness for the intrinsic perilousness of philosophy is lacking, a confrontation that is a philosophizing 
will never occur, no matter how many articles are launched against one another in journals” (Heidegger 
1995, p. 20). However, we should be wary of endorsing simple contrasts between authentic and institu-
tionalized modes of philosophical inquiry. Philosophical thought plausibly has many different roles to 
fulfill and spans many different techniques. What I am concerned with here is one conception of one kind 
of philosophy. I do not want to suggest that any forms of philosophy to which “philosophical empathy” is 
either inapplicable or less applicable are somehow superficial or otherwise inferior.
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common structure. In many instances, the two are also inextricable. Hence, Mer-
leau-Ponty’s account of language and thought can be grafted onto an account of 
empathy as second-person, perceptual or perception-like experience. This substan-
tially extends the reach of empathy, the kinds of cognitive achievements that are 
amenable to empathic access.
In contrast, Merleau-Ponty’s approach is incompatible with current philosophi-
cal orthodoxy, which takes empathy to consist, most centrally, in one or another 
form of simulation.25 Empathy, it is claimed, involves generating a first-person copy 
of someone else’s experience. To qualify as empathy, the simulation must also be 
caused in an appropriate way and the relevant experience must be attributed to the 
other person. A distinction is often drawn between implicit and explicit empathy/
simulation. The former involves effortlessly generating a perception-like experience 
of someone else’s mental life through a non-conscious simulation process, whereas 
the latter involves conscious, effortful replication of mental states. For example, 
Goldman contrasts non-conscious “mirroring” with “reconstructive” empathy, 
while Stueber distinguishes between “basic” and “reenactive” empathy.26 There is 
a further distinction to be drawn between two conceptions of explicit simulation. 
Empathy could be taken to involve appreciating how you would feel when placed 
in someone else’s situation. However, others insist that it requires something more 
demanding than this: an appreciation of what it is like for her to be in that situation, 
which may well differ from what you would experience. For instance, Coplan pro-
poses that empathy is a matter of “other-oriented perspective-taking” rather than just 
putting oneself in another person’s situation.27
None of these achievements capture what Merleau-Ponty describes. Could you 
come to understand another person’s philosophical thinking by replicating it and 
then attributing it to her? If Merleau-Ponty is right, the answer is no. For a start, 
the task would be too psychologically demanding. Philosophical, artistic, and lit-
erary works are entwined in various intricate ways with the lives of their authors. 
This is evident from Merleau-Ponty’s description of Cézanne, where he states that 
a life is not determined by its work or vice versa, but that the two are, nonetheless, 
inseparable:
Although it is certain that a man’s life does not explain his work, it is equally 
certain that the two are connected. The truth is that this work to be done called 
for this life. From the very start, the only equilibrium in Cézanne’s life came 
from the support of his future work. The work to come is hinted at, but it 
would be wrong to take these hints for causes, although they do make a single 
adventure of his life and work.28
What does this “single adventure” amount to? A life and a philosophy share a 
common structure, the latter being integral to the former. That structure consists in a 
25 e.g. Goldman (2006), Stueber (2006), Coplan (2011).
26 Goldman (2011); Stueber (2006).
27 Coplan (2011).
28 Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 20).
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cohesive engagement with possibilities, something that is habitually sculpted (where 
the possibilities comprising a philosophy and those comprising a more general life 
can relate to one another in a number of different ways). Grasping a person’s phi-
losophy does not differ qualitatively from getting to know him; it is just more spe-
cifically focused. We detect a style that pervades and binds together the person’s 
behaviour, where word and thought relate to one another in much the same manner 
as body and soul:
[…] just as a man’s body and “soul” are but two aspects of his way of being 
in the world, so the word and the thought it indicates should not be considered 
two externally related terms: the word bears its meaning in the same way that 
the body incarnates a manner of behaviour.29
In line with criticisms that others have levelled against simulation, it is plausi-
ble to insist that a holistic engagement with the possible cannot be replicated in the 
first-person. Peter Goldie distinguishes “empathetic perspective-shifting” from what 
he calls “in-his-shoes perspective-shifting,” where only the former involves grasp-
ing how things are for someone else.30 Goldie argues that empathetic perspective-
shifting only works in very simple, straightforward cases, where almost everything 
can be taken for granted as shared. When required to simulate the likes of charac-
ter, personality, habits, abilities, and moods, we encounter a problem: it is often the 
case that they only contribute to a person’s experience in the manner they do if they 
remain in the experiential background. However, they cannot do so when featuring 
in an explicit simulation: one can only input the relevant data explicitly and this 
inevitably distorts what one seeks to replicate. Experience has a foreground/back-
ground structure, which must be respected if a simulation is to succeed, but cannot 
be respected if the simulation is explicit. Thus, where a philosophy is holistic, idi-
osyncratic, and embedded in a life, we do not come to empathize with it via explicit 
simulation. Instead of engaging with novel possibilities, we would end up imposing 
our own possibilities upon it.
This leads into a further concern, which applies not only to empathetic perspec-
tive-shifting but to all forms of explicit and implicit simulation. To encounter an 
experience as the experience of another person is to engage with possibilities that 
are integral to it. This cannot be a matter of replicating the other person’s perspec-
tive, as one’s insight into the relevant possibilities differs from hers. What is implicit 
in her experience might be explicitly laid out for me; I might see paths to follow that 
she does not; I might also draw those paths to her attention, revealing new possi-
bilities for her as well. So, there is a structural difference between first- and second-
person experiences of possibility, which remains in place throughout the process. 
Furthermore, experience is dynamic and incomplete; one cannot capture a pure, 
unadulterated, synchronic experience in its entirety. As Slaby points out, experiences 




are not atomistic “inner objects” to be duplicated, contrary to the images that talk of 
“simulating experiences” might conjure up.31
One objection to the view I have sketched here is that understanding a type of 
philosophical position need not involve attributing it to anyone in particular. There-
fore, empathy with its author cannot play a role in its comprehension. However, we 
can respond to this by re-emphasizing Merleau-Ponty’s contrast between original 
and conventional modes of linguistic expression. Philosophical empathy is compat-
ible with typifying the work of others. As you feel your way into a philosophical 
text, you may at first recognize a certain type of position or approach. But you do 
not have to stop there. In any instance where an author uses language in a distinc-
tive, idiosyncratic way, so as to move beyond philosophical convention, there is the 
prospect of zooming in more closely, to experience something of that individual’s 
thought. If Merleau-Ponty is right, and if I am right about Merleau-Ponty, this is not 
a matter of postulating underlying psychological causes but of experiencing a cohe-
sive orientation towards the possible, in a way that is inseparable from comprehend-
ing an explicit philosophical position.
4  Therapeutic empathy
I do not want to rule out the possibility of simulating certain “philosophical” 
aspects of experience and, in the process, somehow contributing to philosophical 
understanding. I have suggested, though, that philosophical empathy cannot consist 
principally in simulation. However, there is a more illuminating comparison to be 
drawn between philosophical empathy and certain accounts of how empathy oper-
ates in clinical and therapeutic contexts. Take, for instance, Carl Rogers’ concep-
tion of empathy. In earlier work, Rogers sometimes describes empathy in ways that 
might be taken to suggest simulation.32 However, drawing inspiration from work 
by Eugene Gendlin, he later comes to characterize it as a collaborative, dialogical 
process–a way of relating to someone that renders one attentive to the flow of her 
experience:
The way of being with another person which is termed empathic has several 
facets. It means entering the private perceptual world of the other and becom-
ing thoroughly at home in it. It involves being sensitive, moment to moment, 
to the changing felt meanings which flow in this other person, to the fear or 
rage or tenderness or confusion or whatever, that he/she is experiencing. It 
means temporarily living in his/her life, moving about in it delicately without 
making judgments, sensing meanings of which he/she is scarcely aware, but 
not trying to uncover feelings of which the person is totally unaware, since 
this would be too threatening. It includes communicating your sensings of his/
her world as you look with fresh and unfrightened eyes at elements of which 
31 Slaby (2014).
32 But for an alternative interpretation, see Ratcliffe (2018).
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the individual is fearful. It means frequently checking with him/her as to the 
accuracy of your sensings, and being guided by the responses you receive. You 
are a confident companion to the person in his/her inner world. By pointing to 
the possible meanings in the flow of his/her experiencing you help the person 
to focus on this useful type of referent, to experience the meanings more fully, 
and to move forward in the experiencing.33
“Entering” a world in this way is quite different from simulating it. Returning 
to Merleau-Ponty on style, it is more like entering an unfamiliar place and experi-
encing an inchoate atmosphere out of which more determinate arrangements take 
shape. The therapist adopts the role of companion rather than duplicate. Her per-
spective differs essentially from that of the client, allowing her to make explicit and 
reshape certain “meanings” by participating in a collaborative process. With this, 
Rogers recognizes the importance of indeterminacy–the ways in which a therapist 
may respond to possibilities that are “there” but not fully recognized by the client.
Various others who describe clinical or therapeutic empathy identify simi-
lar themes, rather than taking simulation to be central. For example, Jodi Halpern 
stresses “curiosity about and attunement to the patient’s predicament,” along with an 
“openness to learning something new.” With this, the empathizer is able to engage 
with experience in a way that enables the client to “expand” and “recontextualize” 
ideas.34 Alfred Margulies explicitly acknowledges the incompleteness of experience 
and how empathic interactions facilitate actualization and transformation of possi-
bilities: “Possibilities are what we reveal or even create; we feel into an aspect of 
the person that does not yet fully exist. Our patients follow us into that potential 
aspect of themselves: They feel into their possibilities for themselves.”35 Again, the 
task is not to duplicate the client’s world, but to experience and interact with its 
possibilities.
An important difference between therapeutic interaction and Merleau-Ponty’s 
relationship with Husserl is that the former involves a dialogical process. In contrast, 
relating to Husserl is one-sided; Husserl cannot respond by correcting Merleau-
Ponty’s reading or by pointing to alternative paths. However, the difference here is 
not qualitative but one of degree. As Merleau-Ponty concedes from the outset, his 
access to Husserl’s thought is limited. We might think of the relationship in terms 
of incomplete or unreciprocated empathy, rather than something altogether different 
from what Rogers and others describe. It can be added that, in many other instances, 
philosophical dialogue is indeed possible, along with experiences of reciprocity and 
mutual enlightenment.
The position I have attributed to Merleau-Ponty is, in my view, a coherent one. 
But is it also plausible? It is difficult to formulate a straightforward argument on 
its behalf. If Merleau-Ponty is right, then a broad philosophical orientation of this 
kind is something one comes to appreciate by inhabiting it and developing a feel 
33 Rogers (1975, p. 4). See also Gendlin (1962).
34 Halpern (2001, xi-xii; p. 41).
35 Margulies (1989, p. 131).
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for it. One cannot be pushed towards it in a reliable way through the force of one or 
another explicit argument. Nevertheless, the account I have sketched does help to 
illuminate a range of phenomena that we encounter over the course of our intellec-
tual lives. And this counts in its favour, at least where alternative approaches fail to 
illuminate or even to acknowledge the phenomena in question.
Take the claim that spoken and written philosophical positions are permeated by 
indeterminate possibilities, pointing in directions that can then be followed. This 
perhaps captures the way in which many of us understand and develop our own 
work over the course of time. For example, here is Stanley Cavell, reflecting on the 
relationships between his early and later works:
But I understand the presence of notable, surprising anticipations to suggest 
something more specific about the way, or space within which, I work, which 
I can put negatively as occurring within the knowledge that I never get things 
right, or let’s rather say, see them through, the first time, causing my efforts 
perpetually to leave things so that they can be, and ask to be, returned to. Put 
positively, it is the knowledge that philosophical ideas reveal their good only in 
stages, and it is not clear whether a later stage will seem to be going forward or 
turning around or stopping, learning to find oneself at a loss.36
Our ideas, at least those that continue to concern us, point in directions that may 
be hazy. Feelings of tension, incompleteness, and even urgency can push us in those 
directions: something must be resolved, completed-it cannot be left as it is. This can 
apply both to one’s own past work and to one’s engagement with others’ work. Simi-
larly, during those moments when we feel understood by another philosopher, the 
experience plausibly consists not so much in someone else seeming to have the same 
ideas, but in having our thoughts followed up, completed, built upon, and steered in 
novel directions.
Merleau-Ponty’s approach is not only consistent with his own linguistic portraits 
of various thinkers. We can also find complementary themes in descriptions that 
others have offered of philosophers and their work. For example, take this excerpt 
from an obituary for the philosopher Bernard Williams (1929–2003):
Dazzlingly quick and devastating in discussion, he was famously able to sum-
marise other people’s arguments better than they could themselves, and antici-
pate an antagonist’s objections to his objections–and, in turn, his objections to 
hers before she had even finished her sentence. Utterly rigorous, yet wonder-
fully non-academic, his philosophy is permeated by a distinctive philosophi-
cal voice–witty, erudite and humane–and by a sense of his own humorous and 
tragic view of life. He always, as one of his devoted ex-students observed, did 
philosophy as a whole human being.37
36 Cavell (2002, xvii).
37 https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/news/2003/jun/13/guard ianob ituar ies.obitu aries (last accessed 4th Janu-
ary 2021).
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Merleau-Ponty provides an account of what it is for a philosophy to have a dis-
tinctive “voice,” how it is done by a “whole human being,” what it is to anticipate 
a thought before it has even been articulated, and how someone else might have a 
better grasp of one’s position than oneself. Nevertheless, there is the lingering worry 
that we can just as well comprehend propositions and criticize philosophical posi-
tions without having any empathic feel for them. So, even if philosophical empathy 
is a real phenomenon, it is inessential to inquiry. No doubt, much philosophical work 
can and does proceed without it. However, this does not apply to any philosophy that 
seeks to reflect upon a world we more usually inhabit comfortably and overlook. 
For Merleau-Ponty, a philosophy cannot escape convention without going beyond 
conventional language. And, if one cannot see past convention, one cannot reflect 
upon the phenomenological achievements that it both presupposes and obscures. 
Philosophy of that nature cannot be done unless one uses language to shake up what 
is ordinarily presupposed, to generate new possibilities that others may then engage 
with. I take this to be integral to Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the “phenomeno-
logical reduction,” something that is invariably partial and requires a “loosening” of 
what binds us to the world, thus illuminating phenomenological achievements that 
are more usually obscured.38
The broader view that experiencing other subjects of experience essentially 
involves a sense of possibility, indeterminacy, and incompleteness is also phenom-
enologically defensible. One way to develop a case for it is to examine various sce-
narios where this sense of the possible is diminished or absent from an interpersonal 
encounter. Here are two candidates:
An Open Book. In the book Lived Time, Eugene Minkowski describes interact-
ing with a particular patient and having a distinctive feeling, which is expressed 
linguistically as “I know all about him.” This feeling involves an experience of the 
patient as lacking something profound, which impedes the ability to experience and 
relate to him as an experiential subject. Reflecting on the nature of the impairment, 
Minkowski concludes that his own feelings of strangeness and privation originate in 
the patient’s experience of time, which lacks a more usual orientation towards the 
future, involving the structured, purposive actualization of possibilities. In relating 
to someone whose world is no longer imbued with this sense of open possibility, 
there is “the impression, in listening to the patient speak, of being constrained to 
read an open book, as if there were nothing behind the pages of that book.”39
Losing Her Twice. In his memoir of bereavement, A Grief Observed, C. S. Lewis 
describes the experience of losing his wife a second time. In striving to preserve her 
in his memory, all he succeeds in retaining is his own image of her. He asks, “won’t 
the composition inevitably become more and more my own?” What is missing is 
any sense of her as a locus of possibility, distinct from his own conception: “The 
reality is no longer there to check me, to pull me up short, as the real H. so often 
did, so unexpectedly, by being so thoroughly herself and not me.” One’s sense of 
a particular person cannot endure by being fixed in memory; whatever image one 
38 Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012, lxxvii).
39 Minkowski (1970, pp. 176–9).
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preserves will impose one’s own possibilities, silencing hers. Later, Lewis writes 
that it is only when he ceased in his preservation-efforts that he “remembered her 
best,” not as a “memory” but as an “instantaneous, unanswerable impression.”40
A common theme of these two examples is that experiencing someone as a 
unique locus of experience involves recognizing and responding to her possibilities, 
rather than comprehending or even simulating however many psychological proper-
ties or entities that either are or were encased inside her skull. A spoken or written 
philosophy may be experienced similarly as alive or dead, present or distant. When 
a philosophy “lives,” there is a self-affecting experience of its possibilities. And this, 
I have suggested, amounts to a kind of empathy. It is not, however, something that is 
exclusive to explicitly philosophical thought. Although inseparable from phenom-
enological method (as conceived of by Merleau-Ponty), it also informs our interac-
tions with art, literature, and other media. The common ingredient is an experience 
of feeling-in (Einfühlung), which can be illuminated by examining the phenomenol-
ogy of possibility, while at the same time resisting firm distinctions between thought 
and its linguistic expression.
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